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The American Economy and  
America’s Global Power
Iwan Morgan
America’s economic strength has long underwritten its leading role in world affairs. The buoyant tax revenues generated by economic growth fund its massive military spending, 
the foundation of its global hard power. America’s economic success is also fundamental to its 
soft power and the promotion of its free-market values in the international economy. Finally, 
prosperity generally makes the American public more willing to support an expansive foreign 
policy on the world stage, whereas economic problems tend to engender popular introspection. 
Ronald Reagan understood that a healthy economy was a prerequisite for American power 
when he became president amid conditions of runaway inflation and recession. As he put it 
in his memoirs, ‘In 1981, no problem the country faced was more serious than the economic 
crisis – not even the need to modernise our armed forces – because without a recovery, we 
couldn’t afford to do the things necessary to make the country strong again or make a serious 
effort to reduce the dangers of nuclear war. Nor could America regain confidence in itself 
and stand tall once again. Nothing was possible unless we made the economy sound again’.
Today the United States has to deal with the impact of far worse economic problems than it did when 
Reagan became president. These include the fallout from the most severe financial crisis since 1929 
(the near-meltdown of the financial system in 2008), the worst recession since the Great Depression 
(the so-called Great Recession of 2007-2009), a fragile recovery that could well falter into a double-
dip recession in 2012, the blowback effects of a European debt crisis, and a future of unsustainable 
public debt without a correction of fiscal course. The current state of the American economy confirms 
the historical trend that downturns resulting from financial crisis (as in the 1870s, 1890s, and 1930s) 
are far more serious than other recessions. However, the debt overhang adds a new and very worrying 
dimension. Indeed America’s fiscal and economic weaknesses are interlinked because the revival of 
economic growth is the necessary first step in dealing with America’s public debt problem. To date, the 
woeful set of economic and fiscal indicators has not seriously diminished America’s global power, but 
it has had some effect and threatens to have much greater – perhaps catastrophic – impact in time. 
 
In immediate terms, it is clear that the United States is far from any tipping point where it has to scale back 
its military power very significantly because of economic and debt problems at home. True, its supporting 
rather than lead role in the NATO intervention in Libya owed something to the Obama White House’s 
desire to contain defence costs while America is still actively engaged against the Taliban in Afghanistan 
and has just started to run down its Iraq commitments. In Obama’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 budget plan, 
defence outlays are also scheduled to decline from 5.1 percent of GDP in FY 2011 to 3.4 percent of 
GDP in FY 2016. Nevertheless, the savings will largely result from the running down of commitments in 
Afghanistan and Iraq and waste elimination rather than the reduction of core strength. Even if a new 
crisis demanded expansion of military spending in the course of the next decade, the United States 
should be able to meet that need without imposing a strain on its economy. 
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On the other hand, the United States will likely face 
strategic restraints in the second decade of this century. 
While short-term defence budget expansion may 
be possible to meet a crisis, a sustained increase 
appears out of the question. The military future for 
the United States, therefore, is one of making do with 
less. It will not keep pace with the defence expansion 
of potential competitors. Russia and China almost 
doubled their military spending over the first decade 
of the twenty-first century and look set to continue 
this rate of growth in the second on the back of 
their buoyant economies. This does not represent 
a threat to the military supremacy of the US, which 
accounted for 46.5 percent of total global military 
spending in 2009, but its competitors will almost 
certainly use their fiscal advantage to disrupt and 
erode its superiority. Moreover, the pressure for deficit 
reduction is highly likely to impact negatively upon 
defence investment that meets future rather than 
immediate needs, particularly in procurement, research 
and development, and personnel development. In 
essence, therefore, the United States may have to 
develop a grand strategy that prioritises ends and links 
them to means, somewhat in the manner of Dwight 
Eisenhower in the 1950s rather than one based on 
assumptions that its economic power can underwrite 
military expansion as in the 1960s, 1980s, and early 
twenty-first century.
From FY 2020 onward, however, the future for US 
military power looks bleaker without a domestic 
correction of fiscal course. According to the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the United States 
will exceed its historic peak for public debt-GDP size 
of 109 percent (reached at the end of World War II) in 
2023 [a new Government Accountability Office report 
projects the somewhat later date of  2027] and will 
experience further fiscal deterioration to approach 
190 percent by 2035. Under that scenario, the three 
largest entitlement programmes – Social Security 
(old age pensions), Medicare (medical assistance for 
the poor), and Medicaid (medical benefits for Social 
Security recipients) – plus interest on the public debt, 
will consume total budget revenues by 2030, requiring 
all other programmes to be funded from the deficit. 
It is these entitlements that are the root cause of 
America’s long-term fiscal problems. According to a 
Government Accountability Office projection, GDP 
is set to expand by 71 percent in real terms from 
2007 to 2031, but spending for Social Security, 
Medicaid, and Medicare is set to increase by 127 
percent, 224 percent, and 235 percent, respectively. 
The Social Security expansion reflects the aging of 
the population as the baby-boom generation, the 
population bulge born between 1945 and 1965, 
reaches retirement age. The growth of healthcare 
outlays is also attributable in part to this, but more 
significantly will result from the inflation of costs 
as medical treatments and technology improve. It 
is unclear whether the Obama health insurance 
programme will have much impact on aggregate 
costs: it will likely reduce demand for Medicaid but 
increase other healthcare outlays.
In the assessment of the CBO, which has a reputation 
for realism rather than hyperbole, ‘The explosive 
path of federal debt ... underscores the need for 
large and rapid policy changes to put the nation on 
a sustainable fiscal course’. It is unthinkable that the 
US government will not take action – it is a matter 
of when, not if – but the longer the debt problem 
remains unaddressed, the greater it will grow and the 
more difficult it will become to resolve. Nevertheless, 
when Washington policymakers do face up to the 
issue and make the difficult choices involved in reining 
in public indebtedness, defence will be very vulnerable 
to retrenchment. Even though its claim on the public 
purse is smaller than that of domestic entitlements, 
military cutbacks are politically easier to effect than 
those on pension and healthcare support.
Replicating the pattern for its military power, America’s 
economic and fiscal problems are likely to impact on 
its position in the international economy more in the 
medium to long-term than in the short-term. Henry 
Kissinger once remarked, ‘Who controls the food 
supply controls the people; who controls the energy 
supply can control whole continents; who controls 
money can control the world’. Allowing for some 
hyperbole in this assessment, it did offer insight into 
the benefits for US international influence of the 
dollar’s status as the world’s major reserve currency. 
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As the dollar declined in value over the last decade, its 
share of allocated global reserves fell from 72 percent 
to 62 percent, suggesting that reserve managers were 
diversifying their holdings into other currencies. The 
main beneficiary of this trend was the euro. Standard& 
Poor’s ([S&P)] downgrading of America’s AAA+ credit 
rating in the wake of the political imbroglio between 
Republicans and Democrats over raising the debt limit 
appeared to spell further trouble for the dollar. 
However, the greenback has become an increasingly 
safe haven for foreign currency holders in light of the 
Eurozone’s deepening financial crisis that threatens 
the very existence of the single currency project. 
Reports that foreign central banks and managers of 
large private funds were shedding Treasury securities 
in 2009-10 were also exaggerated. China, the largest 
holder, was shifting from long-term to short-term 
securities rather than moving out of the dollar. In 
2011, however, there has been a general move back 
to long-term securities that carry higher interest. 
Signifying this, Bill Gross, chief executive of PIMCO (the 
world’s largest fund manager), which had previously 
begun shedding its long-term US bonds, announced 
in October that it was increasing its holdings in them.
Paradoxically, therefore, America’s reserve position 
has actually strengthened in the last two years despite 
its economic and fiscal problems. Its current account 
deficit – its external balance with the rest of the world 
– has also shrunk from a worrying 7 percent of GDP in 
2006 to a more manageable 3.3 percent in mid-2011 
because the fragile economy has reduced demand for 
imports. Moreover, its capacity to borrow from abroad 
remains undiminished because the US broadly remains 
a reliable haven, notwithstanding its S&P credit rating 
downgrade. Indeed the annual cost of its repayments 
on its rising public debt which itself grew from 40.3 
percent of GDP in 2008 to an estimated 72 percent 
of GDP in 2011, actually declined from 1.8 percent 
of GDP to 1.4 percent of GDP over this same period 
thanks to low interest rates.
However, low interest rates will not last forever. The 
United States at some juncture will face increasing 
costs to service its debt. And unless it brings its 
borrowing under control, it may eventually find its 
only recourse is to have massive interest rates to 
overcome creditor fears about a possible default or 
a reversion to debt monetisation (namely printing 
more money to cheapen the dollar and thereby ease 
interest payments). This is unlikely to happen until 
the late 2020s or early 2030s, but the impact on the 
economy will be severe if such monetary manipulation 
becomes necessary.
If the economic effects of America’s indebtedness 
are not yet great, there are signs that it has had an 
impact on its political influence within the international 
economy. In 2004, former Treasury Secretary Larry 
Sumner famously remarked, ‘There is something 
odd about the world’s greatest power also being 
its greatest debtor’. It is even odder that its biggest 
creditor is also its greatest economic challenger, the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). Contrary to the 
usual assumption that economic power goes hand 
in hand with a strong currency, the PRC engaged in 
massive purchase of US Treasuries and other dollar 
assets in the first decade of this century to ensure 
that its currency had a low value against the dollar, 
thereby reaping huge advantages for its products in 
the giant US market. The Bush administration and the 
Obama administration have both sought to persuade 
Beijing to abandon this practice in order both to 
reduce America’s huge bilateral trade deficit with the 
PRC and to head off protectionist sentiment in the 
US Congress. However lack of leverage has blunted 
America’s capacity to get the Chinese to do what 
it wants. (Of course, the US should beware what it 
wishes for in this regard, since the PRC would have 
little reason to extend it easy credit if there were no 
currency exchange benefits to be gained.) 
Being America’s leading creditor gives the PRC a 
certain advantage in dealing with it. Beijing has 
been a very vocal critic of the Federal Reserve’s 
quantitative easing (QE) initiatives to improve the 
flow of credit at home. It worries that this action will 
ultimately cheapen the dollar, thereby undermining 
the value of its holdings. Some analysts believe that 
concern about China’s reaction is one reason why 
the Fed has not engaged in a third round of QE 
despite the evident fragility of the post-recession 
recovery. Others are fearful that the PRC might use 
its creditor clout to bring pressure to bear on the US 
in the event of a geopolitical showdown between the 
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two countries, for example over sovereignty issues 
in the South China Sea. In their view, this could be 
America’s ‘Suez Moment’, a reference to Eisenhower’s 
use of economic leverage to force the withdrawal 
of the 1956 Anglo-French intervention in Egypt. 
 
Undoubtedly being a debtor nation diminishes 
America’s standing in what can be called geo-
economics. This is true with regard to allies as well 
as rivals like the PRC. Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner 
found this out when he participated in a meeting of 
European financial leaders in Wroclaw, Poland, in 
September 2011 to discuss the Eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis that threatened to spread from Greece to 
other nations. His calls for stronger action by member 
nations of the single currency project to provide larger 
bailout funds as security against a Greek default, and 
for greater aid to European banks that were holding 
bad government debts, were dismissively rejected by 
a number of his EU counterparts. Austrian Finance 
Minister Maria Fekter commented, ‘I found it peculiar 
that even though the Americans have significantly 
worse fundamental data than the Eurozone, that they 
tell us what we should do’.
The world also watched on in horror at the showdown 
between the Tea-Party-influenced Republicans and the 
Democrats over the passage of a bill to raise the debt 
limit in mid-2011. The US narrowly avoided a default 
that could have had serious ripple effects throughout 
the global financial community. In effect, conservative 
Republicans resorted to political blackmail to force 
acceptance of large budgetary cuts as their price 
for a deal. Clearly, American legislators have every 
right to pursue the political aims they were elected 
to achieve, but it seemed that the whole world – not 
just the Obama administration – would have to bear 
the cost of their intransigence. The episode damaged 
America’s reputation as a reliable debt payer, leading 
directly to the S&P credit downgrade. The antics of 
what Britain’s Trade Secretary Vince cable dubbed ‘a 
bunch of right-wing nutters’ also exposed the US to 
international ridicule.
The debt limitation imbroglio showed that America is 
an increasingly polarised nation amidst today’s difficult 
economic circumstances. Internal divisions have not 
yet affected its capacity to act on the world stage, but 
they may do so in years to come if the economy does 
not recover its vigour. However American policymakers 
have failed to find the solution to restore growth, jobs 
(unemployment remains stubbornly high at around 
9 percent of the work force), and optimism. The 
monetary instruments of economic management 
helped to end the recession in mid-2009 but have 
had little effect in strengthening recovery. Easing 
the supply of credit has done little to boost demand, 
which remains anaemic. Having binged on credit 
card and loan finance for over a decade, consumers 
are now reining in their borrowing habits because 
job uncertainties (or actual joblessness) make them 
more circumspect about their capacity to repay debt. 
Meanwhile, American banks remain reluctant to lend 
to business because of concern that blowback from 
the European sovereign debt crisis might threaten 
their reserve position. 
In current circumstances, the best way of kick-starting 
the economy is through expansionary fiscal measures 
that would actually create jobs or put money in people’s 
pockets – through initiatives like public works and 
infrastructure projects, extension of unemployment 
compensation beyond 2011 for workers who have 
exhausted their benefits, extension of payroll tax 
cuts into 2012, and more generous assistance to 
hard-pressed state governments who lack the federal 
capacity to borrow because of the balanced-budget 
requirements of their constitutions. Such measures 
could form part of a second stimulus package since the 
first one, enacted early in the Obama administration, 
has come to the end of its three-year duration.
However, the political paralysis that has resulted from 
separate party control of government make it highly 
unlikely that such an initiative will be enacted. The 
Republicans have no interest either in approving 
a statist solution for economic revitalisation or in 
letting Obama claim the credit for economic recovery 
with an election looming. Conversely, the Obama 
administration and the congressional Democrats 
appear unwilling to engage in a political battle to 
force acceptance of their agenda. The likelihood is, 
therefore, that there will be no fiscal initiative to head 
off the threat of a double-dip recession and there will 
be no strong recovery in the short-term.
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Without a strong economic recovery, America will also find it more difficult to resolve its fiscal problems. The 
depressed receipts that are the product of a weak economy – in FY 2011 tax revenues equated to less than 
15 percent of GDP, well below their annual average of 19 percent between 1980 and 2005 – increase the 
difficulties of deficit control. In other words, fiscal actions to boost the economy may increase the deficit in 
the short-term but they will facilitate its eventual reduction. However, economic growth alone cannot get 
the budget under control. Most fiscal experts are in agreement that the United States will have to reform 
entitlement programs to control costs, find ways of enhancing revenue (which would likely have to include 
high taxes, particularly for the top 20 percent of the income distribution), and economise on other programs 
– including defence. Whether the political will exists for such a sweeping assault on public indebtedness 
is unclear. Such a course of action involves slaying two large sacred cows. The Republicans would have to 
swallow higher taxes and the Democrats would have to accept diminution of entitlement benefits.
Americans like to claim they are good at dealing with a crisis. Perhaps they are less effective when it comes 
to pre-empting one. The mushrooming debt is not yet a crisis but it will eventually generate one if left to 
fester. If America awaits a financial crisis before taking action, there is a danger that the scope of the course 
correction it would need to undertake might prove too great. The United States is slowly awakening to the 
reality that growing public indebtedness represents the greatest threat to its power and prosperity in the 
twenty-first century. It remains to be seen whether its political parties and the separate institutions of its 
government can work together for the long-term good of the nation. Winston Churchill famously observed 
that America could be relied on to do the right thing after it had tried everything else. It is to be hoped that 
there will be a timely demonstration of the truth of his remarks with regard to US public indebtedness.■
 
 
